The impact of TBT and SPS measures on Japanese and Korean exports to China by Wood, Jacob et al.
sustainability
Article
The Impact of TBT and SPS Measures on Japanese
and Korean Exports to China
Jacob Wood 1, Jie Wu 2, Yilin Li 3 and Jungsuk Kim 4,*
1 CITBA (Centre of International Trade and Business in Asia), James Cook University Singapore,
Singapore 387380, Singapore; jacob.wood@jcu.edu.au
2 Department of International Economics and Trade, School of Economics, Zhejiang University of Technology,
Hangzhou 310023, China; wujie91@zjut.edu.cn
3 Department of International Trade, College of Economics and Management, Chungnam National University,
Daejeon 305764, Korea; gracelyl0322@gmail.com
4 Department of Economics and Trade, Sejong University, Seoul 05006, Korea
* Correspondence: js_kim@sejong.ac.kr; Tel.: +82-10-4787-8983
Received: 30 September 2019; Accepted: 31 October 2019; Published: 4 November 2019


Abstract: (1) Background: As countries with troubled histories, China, Japan, and Korea have,
in recent times, attempted to overcome political and economic differences in a bid to forge strong
trade relationships. However, Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) have emerged in recent times, which
has the potential to complicate matters. (2) Method: Our study analyzes the impact that two forms
of NTM, technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), have on
Japanese and Korean exports to China. In order to effectively measure their impact, we utilize a
modified version of the Gravity model and the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood method (PPML).
Using three measures (coverage ratio, frequency index, and the dummy variable) to determine their
impact, our study displayed a range of findings. (3) Results: The key results from our study showed
that from a coverage ratio perspective, our research clearly demonstrates that Chinese TBT measures,
reduce Japan and Korea’s manufacturing and total exports as a whole, while Chinese SPS measures
encourage Korean agricultural exports. Moreover, the frequency index results and dummy variable
estimations in the main also supported the coverage ratio findings with SPS measures promoting
Korean agricultural goods exports. (4) Conclusions: Our research highlights the important role
the TBT measures have played to shelter China’s emerging industrial sector from the rigors of
highly competitive Korean and Japanese exporters. In doing so, the Chinese government is able to
actively pursue some of its key sustainable development strategies such as “Made in China 2025”
and “Industrial 4.0”.
Keywords: non-tariff barriers; technical barriers to trade; sanitary and phytosanitary measures;
China; Japan; Korea; exports
1. Introduction
The China, Japan, Korea (CJK) relationship has grown to be one of the most important trilateral
relationships in the world. With significant impacts on economic welfare, security, and peace these
countries profoundly influence the East Asian region and more broadly, the world. Built around their
own distinct relative comparative advantages (see Appendix A Table A1) and industrial structures the
economic relationship between these countries is large, contributing to unprecedented growth in trade
and foreign direct investment (FDI) over the last three decades.
Political sensitivities based around unresolved historical issues and regional rivalries have at
times, threatened to derail this progress. However, unlike other contemporary examples (United
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States—Cuba, India—Pakistan and North and South Korea) where politics have damaged or even
ceased economic relations [1,2], the CJK relationship has successfully developed. China’s decision to
immerse itself within the global economic system from the mid-1980s and its entry into the World Trade
Organization in 2001 has seen its political relationship with Japan become increasingly dominated by a
dynamic and positively evolving economic partnership.
From Japan’s perspective, its economic engagement with China has been important in recent
years, as the country pursues a large-scale externally-driven strategy that will allow it to recover
from the economic downturn of the 1990s. While Korea on the other hand, has used its growing
domestic capabilities to engage in high levels of industrial process-orientated trade. In contrast, China
views both Japan and Korea as an important means from which it can catapult itself to the frontier of
industrial technologies and therefore transition itself from a low to a high income country.
Another key aspect of the CJK relationship is its ongoing Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations,
which will provide significant economic and geopolitical benefits to the three Northeast Asian countries
as well as fostering new opportunities for global multilateral trade [3]. Since the idea for yearly
summits between the three countries was first proposed in 1999, efforts have been made to get a FTA
across the line. Despite an agreement to speed up the negotiations in April 2019, ongoing geopolitical
disagreements continue to hinder substantive progress from being made. In addition to the CJK FTA,
there are also opportunities for the countries to join the Chinese lead Regional Cooperative Economic
Partnership (RCEP) initiative, which has the potential to drive multilateral trade growth in the Asian
region [3]. The RCEP trade proposal is at present not in force, with negotiations still very much
ongoing, however, a decision by the Trump administration to pull out of the Trans Pacific Partnership
(TPP) trade deal, there is now greater optimism that a deal may be struck.
Despite growth in its economic relations with Japan and Korea, China has in recent times taken
steps to balance its ideological trade liberalization agenda, which has seen it sign 16 FTAs, as of
September 2019 [4] and lead the RCEP negotiations, with the demands of higher levels of domestic
pressure. As such, the Chinese government has sought to combat lower tariff levels with an increasing
number of alternative measures. These non-tariff barriers (NTB) have sought to protect its domestic
marketplace from the competitive pressures that are exerted on it by increased import competition (see
Appendix A Table A2). As data World Trade Organization Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (WTO
I-TIP) states, as of 2015, China has the 4th highest number of non-tariff measures (NTM) notifications
in the world, and as a consequence, it requires a detailed and comprehensive system in order to
manage them (see Appendix A Tables A3 and A4). Among the different measures, TBT (Technical
Barriers to Trade) and SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures) are the most common forms. SPS
measures established the fundamental rules and requirements surrounding food safety as well as
animal and plant health standards, while TBT measures are technical regulations and standards that
define acceptable product characteristics relating to design, size, and performance elements as well as
the way it is labelled or packaged [5].
As a WTO member, China is legally able to implement a range of protective measures, under the
WTO TBT/SPS Agreement, that can protect not only human, animal and plant health but also deal
with environmental, wildlife, and human safety factors. However, despite having the authorization to
implement such measures, their rapidly growing use has caught the eye of international trade scholars
with several important empirical studies being developed by [6–11]. These studies, while providing a
comprehensive overview of the key economic issues relating to their modelling and measurement,
have also created ample room for further discussion with results differing depending on the objects,
time frames, and methodological parameters used.
Our study utilizes an adapted Gravity model and the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) methodology to analyze the potential impact TBT and SPS measures have on Japanese and
Korean exports to China. Our research differs from other studies by embracing the concepts of supply
and demand by using disaggregated data, at the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
Systems (HS) 2-digit level, which is related with China’s imports and Japanese and Korea’s exports. In
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addition, China has a large amount of processing trade with Japan and South Korea, that is, Japan and
South Korea produce medium- and high-value-added products and components and ship them to
China for processing, assembly and export to other countries. As a result, much of Japan and South
Korea’s exports to China come from exports in processed goods. Since processed good exports are
almost unaffected by NTMs, it is important that we use the export in processed goods as a control
variable when analyzing the impact of NTMs on exports to China. Considering that there is a strong
positive correlation between exports in processed goods and China’s global export volume, this study
takes China’s global export volume as a proxy variable for the export in processed goods, in an attempt
to control the impact of trade in processed goods on Korean and Japanese exports to China. Coverage
ratios and frequency indexes and a dummy variable is also used for the TBT and SPS measures, at
the HS 4-digit level, so as to quantify the industry-specific impacts that NTMs may have. Given the
important geopolitical and economic relationships of our target countries, our research provides a
crucial assessment of the impact of NTM on trade in East Asia.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the key literature associated
with this study. Section 3 outlines our empirical approach and methodological framework. This is
followed in Section 4 by a detailed analysis of the data and results, before offering some important
policy offerings and concluding thoughts are given in Section 5.
2. Literature Review
As the dynamics of trade policy have changed in recent years, so have the focus of academic
scholars with many choosing to take aim at the impact that TBT and SPS measures have export
outcomes. With several studies emerging that have a key role in helping model [12]) and measure [6])
the impacts of non-tariff measures. There are of course a myriad of other related studies, which have
helped to improve our understanding of these forms of policy initiatives [8,9]). An assessment of the
literature shows that our understanding of non-tariff instruments has evolved significantly over time.
While initially thought of as non-tariff barriers (NTBs), subsequent research has seen them referred
to as NTMs as they are potentially able to hamper or encourage trade [6]). Part of this assessment
has had various methodological approaches adopted, ranging from large econometric studies using
panel and cross sectional data [13]), large computable general equilibrium models [14]) or sector- or
policy-specific econometric studies [15]). Moreover, from an empirical perspective, different proxies
have been used to measure NTMs such as frequency indexes and coverage ratios [8,9,16], which have
shown mixed results as to the impact the measures have on trade flows. While the findings tend to
be negative if NTMs are proxied by ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) [17]. Data use is also an important
consideration, [18] finding that data aggregated at the HS-4 digit level have been found to have a
positive impact on trade flows, while Beckman and Arita [19] showed that data using the HS-6 digit
level was seen to have a negative impact.
In addition to the different methodological approaches taken, several sector-based studies have
shown that NTMs have a negative impact on trade. In this regard, Alaeibakhsh and Ardakani [20]
found that SPS regulations negatively affected the trade of pistachios products from Iran, while Hoda et
al. [21] noted that the SPS measures imposed on Egyptian exports negatively influence the probability
that a firm would export products to a new location. In other works [22,23], NTMs have helped
to encourage trade. More specifically, Moenius [24] found that from an Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development OECD perspective, bilaterally-shared and country-specific product
TBT standards are on average trade-promoting. More prolific however, are the number of studies
that provide evidence of the mixed effects of NTMs on trade. In this regard, Xiong and Beghin [10]
found no specific evidence that EU SPS measures have a significant negative trade impact on African
groundnut exports. While, Choi et al. [25] found that the impact of TBT measures on international
trade flows between China, Japan and Korea was also insignificant.
Another key aspect of the literature highlighted the role that different NTMs or economic
development levels have on the results themselves. In this instance, the fewer NTMs under examination,
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the clearer the policy implications [26]. Moreover, De Frahan and Vancauteren [27] showed that
TBT measures can help to facilitate greater trade flows, while SPS measures are more prohibitive in
nature [28]. From an economic development perspective, several studies have highlighted the negative
effect that NTMs have on the trade flows of developing countries [29,30]. Moreover, Maskus et al. [31]
found that developing country exporters face additional costs when modifying their manufacturing
processes in order to adhere with specific foreign regulations. They argue that such costs highlight the
poorer nation’s inability to deal with the complex administrative, technical and scientific complexities
of the foreign regulatory requirements. In contrast to this, De Frahan and Vancauteren [27] showed
the positive impact that harmonized food regulations could have on the trade flows of developed
countries. The literature also highlighted the important role that firm size plays in overcoming
regulatory provisions. For example, Decreux et al. [32] showed that large industrial players were better
equipped to deal with the NTMs associated with the EU—South Korea free trade agreement.
Given the predominantly developing country focus and the contrasting academic perspectives, it
is imperative that a more detailed assessment is carried out to ascertain the impact that SPS and TBT
measures have on trade flows between the key east Asian economies of Japan and Korea. In addition,
China’s enthusiastic adoption of such measures, and its, at times, sensitive relationship with these
countries validates this need. By examining these countries, this study also helps to establish a means
of providing a future assessment of the before and after effects of the Korea—China FTA.
3. Empirical Framework and Data
3.1. Empirical Model
As mentioned above, with the general reduction in global tariff levels, NTMs have become an
increasingly important trade policy tools. As such, Researchers also pay more attention to the impact
of NTMs on trade flows [5,8,9,15,25]. On the basis of these previous studies, the following empirical
model is constructed to explore the impact of TBT and SPS measures on Japanese and Korean exports
to China.
lnEXP jTC,t = α
j + β
j
1lnEXTS
j
T,t + β
j
2lnIMDC
j
C,t + β
j
3lnEXPC
j
C,t
+β
j
4lnTNTM
j
TC,t + β
j
5lnZTC,t + ε
j
TC,t
(1)
j—product category j of HS2-digit level, from HS01–97, since no data for HS77, so j = 1, 2, . . . , 96;
t is year from 2002 to 2014;
TC represents the target country (Japan and Korea)’s exports to China.
In this instance, ε jTC,t is the error term. For the purpose of this study we use the Pseudo Poisson
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation methodology. As proposed by various authors [32–34],
the PPML method allows us to deal with the presence of zero export flows as well as any serious
heteroskedasticity problems. Therefore, the empirical analysis is conducted using the PPML method.
3.2. Dependent and Independent Variables
3.2.1. Dependent Variable EXP jTC,t
The dependent variable, which represents the nominal export value of product j from the target
country (Japan or Korea) to China in year t. We obtained the data from the Korea International Trade
Association (hereafter KITA).
3.2.2. Independent Variables
Export Supply—EXTS jT,t
Export supply refers to the total nominal export value of product j from the target country to the
world in year t excluding those exports to China. The variable was calculated using data provided
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by KITA. It represents the supply capacity of each individual country’s products (HS codes 01–97) to
the world. The greater the value, which means the target country’s products enjoy a comparative
advantage in the global market, the more likely to expect an increase in their exports to China.
Import Demand—IMDC jC,t
Import demand is defined as the nominal value of China’s imports of product j from the world
in year t excluding those from the target countries. The variable was also calculated using data
provided by KITA. This variable represents China’s gross import demand for product j in year t. With
China experiencing significant improvements in living standards, import demand is rising and as a
consequence, Japan and Korea will export more in order to meet this higher demand.
China’s Total Exports to the World—EXPC jC,t
This variable in defined as the total nominal value of product j exported by China to the World
in year t using data obtained from KITA. When one considers the high level of trade in processed
products that occurs between China and the target countries, there is an expectation that there will be a
corresponding shift between the target countries’ exports to China and China’s exports to the world.
Tariff and Non-Tariff Measures Imposed by China—TNTM jC,t
Using data obtained from the World Bank and WTO, TNTM jC,t denotes the tariff and non-tariff
measures imposed by China on product j at year t. First, we use the applied average weighted tariff to
measure any potential impact of the tariff may have and expect that a reduction in the tariff level will
promote an increase in exports from the target country (imports of China). In addition, we consider
three ways (six different variables) to examine the SPS and TBT measures. Firstly, a coverage ratio
(the coverage ratio measures the percentage of trade value subjected to NTMs for the target country’s
products; measured by way of a coverage ratio are defined as SPSC and TBTC). Secondly, a frequency
index (the frequency index represents the percentage of products subjected to NTMs; it is measured
by way of a frequency index and are defined as SPSF and TBTF). Thirdly, a quantity-impact measure
(measured by way of a dummy variable, equal to one, if China notifies at least one TBT or SPS measure
and are defined as DSPS and DTBT). Given the interpretation of most of China’s notifications is done
at the HS4-digit level, the SPS and TBT coverage ratios, frequency indexes and dummy variables
calculated in this study is also at the HS4-digit level (1257 products) from 2002 to 2014. Once this is
done, they are then aggregated according to the HS2-digit level format. In specific formulaic terms, the
coverage ratio of product category j at the year of t is defined as:
CR jt=
[∑
DitVit∑
Vit
]
× 100 (2)
i—product item i of HS4-digit level; i = 1, 2, . . . , 1257;
j—product category j of HS2-digit level; j = 1, 2, . . . , 96;
t—2002–2014.
In this instance, i is a product item at the 4-digit HS code level in which it forms part of product
category j which represents the broader 2-digit HS code level. If a particular NTM is applied to a
product i at the year of t, the dummy variable Dit. takes the value of one or zero; and Vit is the value of
the target country’s exports for product i; The sum of Vit (
∑
Vit) represents the export value of product
category j at the year of t.
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Second, the frequency index is calculated as the share of the number of import item in a certain
product category that are affected by NTMs. In formulaic terms, the frequency index for product
category j in the year t is denoted as being:
FI jt =
[∑
DitMit∑
Mit
]
× 100 (3)
i—product item i of HS4-digit level; i = 1, 2, . . . , 1257;
j—product category j of HS2-digit level; j = 1, 2, . . . , 96;
t—2002–2014.
In this instance, i denotes a specific product item at the 4-digit HS code level in which it forms
part of product category j which represents the broader 2-digit HS code level. Dit is defined in the
same manner as equation (2), and Mit is also a dummy variable which is equal to one if there is an
import of product i. or zero if no measure is present.
The coverage ratio and frequency index are used to measure the restrictiveness of trade measures.
Their respective values both range from 0 and 100, however as they interpret the restrictiveness of trade
measures from different perspectives, the coverage ratio in terms of depth, and the frequency index in
terms of range, then the calculated values for the two approaches are different. The quantity-impact
measure is usually based on the frequency or coverage index, along with a dummy variable which is
equal to one if an NTM is present. That is to say, this variable will be equal to one if the coverage ratio
or frequency index is not zero at the HS4-digit level.
To show the depth and range of restrictiveness in a simplistic manner, we calculated the coverage
ratios and frequency indexes of the products affected by TBT and SPS measures at the HS2-digit level
(96 products) for the period from 2002 to 2014 (see Appendix A Tables A5 and A6). Among the Chinese
notifications for these NTMs, the TBT measures (at the HS2-digit level) affected 92.36 percent of all
Japan exports, 94.55 percent of all Korean exports in 2008 and 93.37 percent of Korean and 96.09 percent
of Japan in 2009; while SPS measures affected 20.22 percent of Japan’s total exports in 2010 and 18.82 in
2009 while 19.26 percent of Korea’s total exports in 2010 and 19.65 percent in 2011.
Other Related Variables ZTC,t
ZTC,t includes two control variables: real exchange rate (RER) and Internet that appear in related
gravity models. For the real exchange rate, it is calculated by using the nominal exchange rate of the
Chinese yuan vis-à-vis a particular target country’s currency and the Consumer Price Index (2010 = 100)
data of related countries. A rise in RER represents a devaluation of the currency of the target country,
which makes their exports cheaper and more attractive, then an increase in their exports will be
expected. While the Internet variable is defined as the number of internet users per 100 people in China,
which represents the developmental level of social infrastructure in China. Our research assumes
that social infrastructure development helps to promote a target country’s exports to China. The
data for the Internet variable was obtained from the World Bank, while the nominal exchange rate
and Consumer Price Index (2010 = 100) data for China and Japan and Korea were obtained from the
International Monetary Fund.
3.3. Data
Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the study are shown in Table 1. As mentioned
earlier, for the NTMs that we have focused on, the minimum value of coverage ratio and frequency
index is 0 and the maximum value is 100, and the mean value of TBT is greater than that of the SPS
measures in terms of both the coverage ratio and frequency index. This indicates that when compared
with SPS measures, China imposes more TBT measures. As Table 1 shows, the dependent variable and
independent variables (especially those related to trade flow) show high dispersions, therefore this
study utilized the PPML methodology to conduct the empirical analysis.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the study.
Unit Count Mean SD Min Max
EXP thousand US $ 2496 1,004,095 3,818,547 0 51,181,581
IMDC thousand US $ 2496 10,213,815 35,224,372 1737 399,673,498
EXTS thousand US $ 2496 4,297,141 15,785,347 43 163,724,342
EXPC thousand US $ 2496 13,620,772 46,146,838 8847 571,186,012
Tariff Ratio 2496 5.14 2.74 3.21 14.1
TBTC Ratio 2496 20.20 37.62 0 100
SPSC Ratio 2496 7.35 24.93 0 100
TBTF Ratio 2496 19.29 35.71 0 100
SPSF Ratio 2496 6.93 23.76 0 100
DTBT dummyvariable 2496 0.11 0.32 0 1
DSPS dummyvariable 2496 0.35 0.48 0 1
RER 1 CNY/KRW 2496 85.59 73.85 11.04 186.32
Internet Ratio 2496 24.20 15.80 4.6 49.3
Note: The nominal export value (EXP), Chinese import demand (IMDC), export supply (EXTS), China’s total exports
to the world (EXPC), Tariff (Tariff ), TBT Coverage Ratio (TBTC), SPS Coverage Ratio (SPSC), TBT Frequency Index
(TBTF), SPS Frequency Index (SPSF), Dummy Variable TBT (DTBT), Dummy Variable SPS (DSPS), Real exchange
rate (RER), Internet (Internet).
4. Empirical Analysis and Discussion
4.1. Analysis of Results
By using variables identified within the literature, our research empirically examined the impact
that TBT and SPS measures have on target countries’ exports to China. Following an initial analysis of
cross-correlation patterns among the explanatory variables (see Appendix A: Table A7) we were able
to ascertain that of the variables measured, Tariff and Internet were shown to display high levels of
correlation (in this case a correlation of more than 0.8). As a consequence of these multicollinearity
concerns, we chose to analyze the effects of Tariff and Internet separately. Moreover, we assessed the
effect of TBT and SPS measures by examining not only the product sample as a whole (HS 01–97) but
also into agricultural (HS 01–24) and manufactural (HS 25–97) goods categories. This allowed us to
ascertain if differences existed between the effects of TBT and SPS measures on the particular industries.
The results for this analysis using both the coverage ratio and frequency index measures are shown in
Tables 2–4, while the results using the dummy variables are shown in Tables A8–A10. Overall, the
results displayed a high-level of explanatory power with R2 values ranging from 0.75 to 0.96. Before
discussing the implications of our findings, time will first be taken to provide a brief analysis of other
independent variables’ results.
In regards to target country export supply (EXTS) and Chinese import demand (IMDC) the
results were found to be positive and statistically significant in all the models, which was in line
with our initial projections. While in other results, the coefficient estimates for China’s total exports
to the world (EXPC) were positive and highly significant for the whole sample and manufacturing
industry. This suggests that there is a corresponding relationship between movements in Japan and
Korea’s exports to China and China’s exports to the world. This finding illustrates the nature of the
process-orientated trade occurs in the manufacturing sectors between China and Japan-Korea. As
Table A2 shows, the top ten HS2-digit level product exports, are all from the manufacturing sector, and
make-up an overwhelming share of target countries’ total export base (89.43% for Korea and 85.27%
for Japan) which definitely has a bearing on the overall results.
The coefficient results of the Tariff variable were negative and statistically significant (from −0.17
to −0.16) for the total sample (as shown in Table 2, Table A8) which is line with our initial expectation
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that the reduction of tariff level will promote China’s imports. The results for the Internet, were
found to be statistically significant and positive (from 0.12 to 0.47) for the agricultural sector of Korea
and manufacturing sector of Japan which was supportive of our initial projections while statistically
significant but negative for Japan’s agricultural exports. The real exchange rate, was found to be
statistically insignificant for the manufacturing sector of Japan while insignificant and negative for
Korea. This final result was surprising and is in contrast to our initial expectation that assumed a
depreciation in the value of the target countries’ currency would lead to an increase in demand for
target countries’ exports. For the country specific effects, the coefficient estimates of the country dummy
variable for Japan in Tables 2 and A8 were found to be statistically significant and negative, which
suggested that Korean exports had a comparative advantage and were doing better than Japanese exports
to China. This is an important finding as it eludes to a greater more systemic problem of the state of the
Japanese economy which for some time now has been wallowing in a pit of poor economic performance.
Next is the analysis results of our main concern variables, TBT and SPS measures on the target
country’s exports to China. Firstly, in regards to coverage ratio estimation results, TBT was found
to be negative (from −0.05 to −0.08) and statistically significant for both the manufacturing sector
and the sample as a whole and Korea respectively but insignificant for the manufacturing exports of
Japan (from −0.03 to −0.02). While the SPS measure was positive (0.06) and statistically significant
for the agricultural results of Korea, but was insignificant and negatively signed (−0.01) for Japan.
The TBT findings in this respect support the conclusions of the empirical analysis by Devadson et
al. [35], who highlighted the negative impact that these measures had on ASEAN industrial exports to
China. In summary, the coverage estimation results show that TBT measures imposed by China, have
an inhibitory effect on both the manufacturing exports and total exports of Japan and South Korea,
while China’s SPS measures are conducive to the promotion of South Korea’s agricultural exports. In
summary, the impact of the TBT measures on the sample as a whole and in particular manufacturing
goods is negative. This applies to all three cases, i.e., the Total, Japan and Korean results. While on the
other hand, the SPS measures were found to have a positive impact on the manufacturing sector for
the Total, Japan and Korean results. Within the same scope, there is no conflict between any of the
countries results. Equally, in terms of the agricultural sector, the SPS measures had a positive effect on
Korean exports while the other two cases are statistically insignificant. Finally, the results also showed
a positive impact of SPS measures on manufacturing exports for all three cases. These two results seem
reflect similar explanations. More specifically, when China applies a higher level of SPS measures,
the Chinese people become increasingly aware of the SPS issues related to food safety. We assume
that this increased public concern for food safety would lead to a change in consumer habits whereby
local consumers move away from purchasing domestic agricultural products or products from less
developed countries to more developed countries including Japan and Korea. In addition, the positive
impact of the SPS measure of agriculture exports of Korea bears the same explanation.
Second, we developed a frequency index as part of the assessment, taking into account the
endogenous issues inherent in coverage ratio. In this instance, Tables 2–4 demonstrate that the TBT
measures are statistically insignificant for the manufacturing sector of the sample as a whole and for
Korea in particular, but are statistically significant and negatively signed for Japan which is in direct
contrast to the coverage ratio findings. While the SPS estimation results are similar with the coverage
ratio findings. To sum up, the estimation results of frequency index show that SPS measures promote
Korean agricultural goods exports and reduce Japan’s manufacturing goods exports.
Finally, we use the dummy variable method for further analysis. The coefficient estimates of
TBT and SPS using dummy variable are shown in Appendix A Tables A8–A10. The results show
the TBT measure to be statistically insignificant and negatively signed for the manufacturing sector
findings of Japan and Korea, while the SPS measures are positive and statistically significant for Korean
agricultural goods exports and statistically insignificant and negatively signed for Japan’s agricultural
sector, which is the same as the SPS coverage ratio and frequency index findings.
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Table 2. Estimation results of total sample.
Whole Sample (HS01–97) Agriculture (HS01–24) Manufacture (HS25–97)
EXTS
0.50 *** 0.50 *** 0.51 *** 0.51 *** 1.06 *** 1.06 *** 1.06 *** 1.06 *** 0.47 *** 0.47 *** 0.48 *** 0.48 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
IMDC
0.41 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** 0.19 *** 0.20 *** 0.19 *** 0.20 *** 0.42 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
EXPC
0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.15 *** 0.14 *** 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.15 *** 0.15 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Tariff −0.17 ** −0.17 ** −0.29 * −0.28 * −0.16 ** −0.17 **
(0.08) (0.08) (0.17) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08)
TBTC
−0.06 *** −0.05 *** −0.03 −0.03 −0.05 ** −0.05 **
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SPSC
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.10*** 0.10 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
TBTF
−0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SPSF
0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.12 *** 0.12 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
RER
−0.37 ** −0.54 ** −0.41 ** −0.58 *** −0.54 −0.52 −0.53 −0.51 −0.35 ** −0.51 ** −0.39 ** −0.54 ***
(0.17) (0.21) (0.17) (0.21) (0.35) (0.45) (0.35) (0.45) (0.17) (0.21) (0.17) (0.21)
Internet
0.10** 0.10 ** 0.07 0.07 0.09 ** 0.09**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04)
Country—JP −0.99 ** −1.41 *** −1.09 *** −1.49 *** −1.54 * −1.50 −1.52 * −1.49 −0.92 ** −1.31 ** −1.01 ** −1.40 ***
(0.42) (0.52) (0.41) (0.51) (0.84) (1.12) (0.84) (1.11) (0.41) (0.52) (0.41) (0.51)
Constant
−0.29 0.05 −0.22 0.08 −2.71 −3.54 −2.74 −3.54 −0.06 0.24 −0.04 0.25
(0.91) (0.98) (0.91) (0.98) (1.83) (2.26) (1.81) (2.23) (0.90) (0.98) (0.90) (0.98)
Pseudo log
likelihood −373,000,000 −372,000,000 −366,000,000 −366,000,000 −3,250,000 −3,270,000 −3,240,000 −3,260,000 −350,000,000 −349,000,000 −345,000,000 −34,500,0000
Number of
observations 2496 2496 2496 2496 624 624 624 624 1872 1872 1872 1872
R2 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3. Estimation results of Japan.
Whole Sample (HS01–97) Agriculture (HS01–24) Manufacture (HS25–97)
EXTS
0.55 *** 0.56 *** 0.55 *** 0.55 *** 1.15 *** 1.16 *** 1.15*** 1.16 *** 0.52 *** 0.53 *** 0.52 *** 0.52 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
IMDC
0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.29 *** 0.30 *** 0.29*** 0.30 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
EXPC
0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.19 *** 0.21 *** 0.19*** 0.21 *** 0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.14 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Tariff
−0.28 *** −0.27 *** 0.40** 0.40** −0.26 *** −0.25 ***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.19) (0.08) (0.08)
TBTC
−0.03 ** −0.03 ** 0.00 0.02 −0.03 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
SPSC
−0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.06 *** 0.06 **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
TBTF
−0.04 ** −0.04 ** 0.00 0.02 −0.03 * −0.03 *
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
SPSF
0.01 0.00 −0.02 −0.01 0.07 *** 0.06 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
RER
−0.68 *** −0.83 *** −0.66 *** −0.80 *** −1.21 ** −0.22 −1.18** −0.18 −0.64 *** −0.78 *** −0.62 *** −0.76 ***
(0.19) (0.22) (0.18) (0.21) (0.52) (0.53) (0.52) (0.53) (0.19) (0.22) (0.18) (0.22)
Internet
0.14 *** 0.13 *** −0.42 *** −0.43 *** 0.13 *** 0.12 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant
0.15 −0.26 0.13 −0.27 −8.43 *** −9.66 *** −8.49*** −9.73 *** 0.37 −0.01 0.35 −0.03
(0.56) (0.49) (0.55) (0.49) (1.66) (1.34) (1.66) (1.34) (0.56) (0.50) (0.55) (0.50)
Pseudo log
likelihood −131,000,000 −130,000,000 −131,000,000 −130,000,000 −1,110,000 −1,030,000 −1,110,000 −1,030,000 −121,000,000 −120,000,000 −121,000,000 −120,000,000
Number of
observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 312 312 312 312 936 936 936 936
R2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.87 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.96
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4. Estimation results of South Korea.
Whole Sample (HS01–97) Agriculture (HS01–24) Manufacture (HS25–97)
EXTS
0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.38 *** 0.38 *** 0.99 *** 0.99 *** 0.99 *** 0.99 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.34 *** 0.34 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
IMDC
0.53 *** 0.53 *** 0.53 *** 0.53 *** 0.12 *** 0.11 *** 0.12 *** 0.12 *** 0.55 *** 0.55 *** 0.55 *** 0.55 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
EXPC
0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.20 *** 0.20 *** −0.07 −0.08 −0.08 −0.08 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.20 *** 0.20 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Tariff −0.08 −0.06 −0.80 *** −0.79 *** −0.09 −0.06
(0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.14)
TBTC
−0.08 *** −0.08 *** −0.05 −0.05 −0.08 ** −0.08 **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
SPSC
0.04 0.04 0.06 ** 0.06 ** 0.15 *** 0.15 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
TBTF
−0.04 −0.04 −0.05 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
SPSF
0.06 0.06 0.05* 0.06 ** 0.16 *** 0.16 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
RER
−0.06 −0.04 −0.07 0.04 0.13 −1.00 ** 0.15 −0.98 * −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 0.05
(0.26) (0.36) (0.27) (0.38) (0.38) (0.51) (0.37) (0.50) (0.25) (0.35) (0.26) (0.37)
Internet
0.01 −0.02 0.47 *** 0.47 *** 0.02 −0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Constant
−2.79 ** −3.10 * −3.06 ** −3.70 ** −1.93 1.32 −2.07 1.20 −2.43 * −2.68 −2.84 ** −3.45 **
(1.36) (1.69) (1.41) (1.79) (2.21) (2.60) (2.20) (2.57) (1.31) (1.66) (1.37) (1.75)
Pseudo log
likelihood −225,000,000 −225,000,000 −216,000,000 −216,000,000 −1,630,000 −1,610,000 −1,620,000 −1,600,000 −210,000,000 −210,000,000 −203,000,000 −203,000,000
Number of
observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 312 312 312 312 936 936 936 936
R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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4.2. Discussion and Policy Implications
The results from our study present a number of important issues that warrant further discussion.
As the three largest economies in Asia, China, Korea, and Japan play an important role in not just
the region but also the wider global economy. Despite experiencing many setbacks throughout their
long histories, in recent times, progress has been made and stronger economic and diplomatic ties are
being forged, albeit relatively slowly. A key part of this evolving relationship has been growth in their
respective trading relationships. Since China joined the WTO in 2001, the level of trade between the
countries has grown significantly (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Trading between China and its Partners Japan and Korea (2002-2015). Source: UN
Comtrade [36].
Given the significant developments in the level of trade that has occurred between China and
two of its most important trade partners, the Chinese government has sought to implement measures
that not only enhance opportunities (such as the China—Korea FTA, CJK FTA and RCEP), but also
protect vulnerable domestic industries. The highly competitive Korean and Japanese manufacturing
sectors in particular have, in recent years, expanded their corporate activities in China. Given declines
in tariff related barriers, as part of its WTO involvement, the Chinese government has responded to
these additional competitive pressures by implementing a range of non-tariff measures such as TBT or
SPS requirements. Previous empirical studies have shown that the impact of TBT and SPS measures
has shown mixed results, with studies suggesting that trade can be both repressed or increased as a
consequence of their implementation. However, in the case of this study, we have found that from
a coverage ratio perspective, Chinese TBT measures, negatively impact (repress) both Japan and
Korea’s manufacturing exports to China. This supports our initial expectation and the findings of a
previous study [35] and is indicative of the threat they pose to China’s growing domestic industrial
base. As a country of rapid economic development, the Chinese government is consciousness of the
fact that it needs to temper foreign direct investment with a desire to provide sound employment
opportunities for its citizens. Given that most of its industrial strength lies in low-skilled, low-tech
areas [37], it is imperative that its domestic industry has sufficient breathing space in order to transition
its industries into a more hi-tech sphere. TBT help to provide this space by increasing production costs
for Japanese and Korean exporters and in doing so, improve the price competitiveness of domestic
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firms. The barriers also act as a safeguard for Chinese firms in that it can give them the access to
the additional time they need to enhance not only their technical capabilities but also the human
resource and management skills required to drive these hi-tech businesses forward. From a Japanese
and Korean perspective, these non-tariff measures present a different set of challenges than previous
tariff-related forms of Chinese trade policy. As these new measures require a range of improvisations,
including technical adjustments, it is important that business take the steps it deems necessary to
address the particular issues it is confronted with. From an agricultural perspective, our results in the
main showed that Chinese SPS measures help to promote Korean agricultural exports. In recent years,
the Chinese economy has leapt to life. Inclusion in the WTO, market liberalization policies, and a more
global outlook has helped to create an increasingly well-informed burgeoning middle class. Within
this domain lie well-educated consumers that have a strong grasp on and awareness of health and
food safety standards. As such, they demand higher quality products. Within the agricultural sector,
despair at the poor quality of domestic produce has seen Chinese consumers embrace foreign suppliers.
However, in order to guarantee their access to food products that are safe and of a high standard, the
Chinese government has implemented a myriad of SPS requirements. Their impact has not only put
the onus on domestic producers to up their game but it has also helped to improve the quality of
produce exported to China. In the case of Korea, these SPS measures reflect both improvements in its
agricultural product quality but also an increase exposure of and liking for Korean produce, spurred
on by the indelible attributes of the so-called Korean wave.
The results from the study also raise a number of other important issues relating to the formation
of a possible China—Japan—Korea FTA. By identifying the impact that non-tariff barriers have on
Japanese and Korean exports to China, this study has helped to bring to the fore important areas
of consideration, particularly from a trade negotiation perspective. Given tariff rates have fallen to
historic lows across almost all sectors, NTMs have become an important negotiating tool. As TBT
requirements negatively impact manufacturing imports, the Japanese and Korean governments may
seek concessions in other industry segments. The NTMs may also stimulate domestic opposition
to any future among the three countries. For there is a mountain of evidence that demonstrates the
negative impact that domestic labor unions and interest groups have can have on international trade
negotiation outcomes [38–44] As such, any formal agreement between the three countries would have
to clearly account for the costs or measures that are associated with these non-tariff requirements. In
addition, for any agreement to be reached other political issues would need to be dealt with. Recently,
attempts have been made in this regard, with the Japanese government offering a hard fought apology
over the treatment of so-called comfort women during its 1910–1945 occupation of Korea. However,
other problems still remain such as a need for Japan to apologize for its invasion and war with China
during the Japanese colonial period. Once these matters are resolved and the issues regarding NTMs
are effectively understood then a FTA may be possible. In the meantime, the trading relationship
between China and its Japanese and Korean partners will continue to evolve.
5. Conclusions
This study provided an in depth appraisal of the impact that TBT and SPS measures have on
Japanese and Korean exports to China. As most studies have had a developing country focus, our
research provides added impetus to the knowledge we have on more developed East Asian economies.
By establishing a well-structured methodology that incorporated clearly defined variables our study
utilized an adapted gravity model and the PPML method in order to conduct this assessment. In
conjunction with this, our analysis also included the use of a coverage ratio and frequency indexes in
order to better understand the effect of these NTMs.
Overall, our model displayed a high-level of explanatory power with R2 values ranging from
0.75 to 0.96, while our results were in many regards in line with expectations. The results from our
study showed that from a coverage ratio perspective, our findings show that Chinese TBT measures,
reduced both Japan and Korea’s manufacturing and total exports, while Chinese SPS measures actually
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encouraged Korean agricultural exports. While the frequency index results in the main supported
the coverage ration findings with SPS measures promoting Korean agricultural goods exports and
depressing Japan’s manufacturing goods exports. Finally, our dummy variable estimations found
SPS measures help to stimulate growth in Korean agricultural goods exports. Overall, our results
demonstrate that TBT measures help to provide a very much developing Chinese industrial sector
from the rigors of highly competitive Korean and Japanese exporters. By protecting the domestic
manufacturers, the Chinese government is able to actively pursue some of its key development
strategies such as “Industrial 4.0” and “Made in China 2025”. The results also highlight the rise of
the Chinese consumer and the extra demands that they require, particularly in terms of agricultural
products. There greater awareness of health and safety standards is forcing serious exporters to
enhance the quality of the products they manufacture.
The study has provided an important assessment of how certain NTMs impact Korean and
Japanese exports to China. These countries share a colorful past and with the greater Asian region
experiencing significant growth their future from an international trade perspective is an important
factor in this growth. Understanding how these types of measures impact the export of agricultural
and manufacturing products will play a key role in shaping any future CJK FTA.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Industries Revealed Competitive Advantage Index in 2010.
Country Food Textile Wood Paper Chemicals Plastic Minerals Metals Machinery Electrical Transport Miscellaneous Manufacturing.
China 0.85 1.44 1.13 1.21 0.99 0.99 1.05 1.18 1.10 1.13 1.16 NA
Japan 0.63 0.81 NA 1.00 0.90 0.94 0.81 0.90 1.12 1.11 1.06 1.01
Korea 0.72 1.04 0.75 0.93 1.12 1.07 0.90 0.97 0.98 1.15 1.13 1.03
Source: Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCA) database [45].
Table A2. Top 10 Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (HS) code exports for the sum of 2002–2014 (in thousand USD).
Description HS Code
Japan South Korea
Total: 1,329,641,214 Share Total: 1,176,580,023 Share
Electrical, electronic equipment 85 317,894,031 23.91% 342,739,620 29.13%
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc. 84 289,052,900 21.74% 142,850,549 12.14%
Vehicles other than railway, tramway 87 114,345,325 8.60% 51,033,246 4.34%
Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc. apparatus 90 98,509,245 7.41% 161,923,812 13.76%
Iron and steel 72 87,343,859 6.57% 43,995,865 3.74%
Organic chemicals 29 76,298,104 5.74% 113,437,432 9.64%
Plastics and articles thereof 39 74,128,793 5.58% 87,046,842 7.40%
Copper and articles thereof 74 32,832,807 2.47% 19,925,193 1.69%
Articles of iron or steel 73 21,753,643 1.64% 9,173,031 0.78%
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc. 27 21,621,843 1.63% 80,071,083 6.81%
Source: Korea International Trade Association (KITA) database [46].
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Table A3. TBT Measures.
Laws and Regulations Relevant Government Bodies
The law on Import and Export Commodity inspection, the Regulations for the
Implementation of the Law on Import and Export Commodity Inspection General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ)
The Law on Food Safety, the regulations for the Implementation of the Law on
Food Safety Ministry of Health (MOH), AQSIQ, State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA)
The Law on Product Quality AQSIQ
The Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Ministry of Environmental Protection (MOEP)
The Standardization Law, the Regulations for the Implementation of the
Standardization Law AQSIQ, Standardization Administration of the People’s Republic of China
The Drug Administration Law, the Regulations for the Implementation of the Drug
Administration Law, the Regulations on Supervision and Management to
Medical Instruments
SFDA
The Regulations on Certification and Accreditation AQSIQ, the Certification and Accreditation Administration of the People’s Republicof China
The Telecommunications Regulations The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT)
Table A4. SPS Measures.
Primary Laws and Regulations Relevant Government Bodies
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Entry and Exit Animal and Plant
Quarantine; and other relevant laws and regulations.
AQSIQ, MOH, SFDA, SFAThe Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China
on Entry and Exit Animal and Plant Quarantine;
The Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China;
The Regulations for the Implementation of the Food Safety Law of the People’s
Republic of China
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Table A5. The range (1) and depth (2) of restrictiveness of the trade measures (calculated at the HS2-digit level): Japan.
Types of Measure Year Number of AffectedProducts (1) Total No.
Restrictiveness = (1)/
Total Number of
Products
Affected Imports
(Thousand US $) (2)
Total Imports
(Thousand US $)
Restrictiveness = (2)/
Total Number of
Products
TBT
2002 10 96 10.42% 14,591,519 38,155,903 38.24%
2003 36 96 37.50% 43,451,501 54,942,295 79.09%
2004 31 96 32.29% 60,083,246 70,562,552 85.15%
2005 40 96 41.67% 63,627,726 76,179,581 83.52%
2006 42 96 43.75% 69,545,611 88,330,841 78.73%
2007 39 96 40.63% 85,157,265 102,154,358 83.36%
2008 49 96 51.04% 108,861,645 117,872,822 92.36%
2009 43 96 44.79% 96,478,547 102,911,697 93.75%
2010 40 96 41.67% 114,867,609 141,522,756 81.17%
2011 42 96 43.75% 141,486,070 155,026,705 91.27%
2012 37 96 38.54% 108,221,464 137,663,475 78.61%
2013 21 96 21.88% 92,610,605 123,773,585 74.82%
2014 10 96 10.42% 79,239,258 120,544,644 66.52%
SPS
2002 16 96 16.67% 525,391 38,155,903 1.38%
2003 10 96 10.42% 148,349 54,942,295 0.27%
2004 15 96 15.63% 311,351 70,562,552 0.44%
2005 5 96 5.21% 5,142,100 76,179,581 6.75%
2006 2 96 2.08% 20,622 88,330,841 0.02%
2007 1 96 1.04% 3,877 102,154,358 0.00%
2008 19 96 19.79% 23,828,419 117,872,822 20.22%
2009 6 96 6.25% 19,367,778 102,911,697 18.82%
2010 17 96 17.71% 22,229,378 141,522,756 15.71%
2011 22 96 22.92% 21,808,806 155,026,705 14.07%
2012 5 96 5.21% 37,216 137,663,475 0.03%
2013 12 96 12.50% 8,884,657 123,773,585 7.18%
2014 15 96 15.63% 786,672 120,544,644 0.65%
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Table A6. The range (1) and depth (2) of restrictiveness of the trade measures (calculated at the HS2-digit level): South Korea.
Types of Measure Year Number of AffectedProducts (1) Total No.
Restrictiveness= (1)/
Total Number of
Products
Affected Imports
(Thousand US $) (2)
Total Imports
(Thousand US $)
Restrictiveness=(2)/
Total Number of
Products
TBT
2002 9 96 9.38% 4,897,842 23,753,587 20.62%
2003 35 96 36.46% 24,242,667 35,109,712 69.05%
2004 32 96 33.33% 37,591,767 49,763,173 75.54%
2005 38 96 39.58% 48,073,125 61,914,983 77.64%
2006 42 96 43.75% 53,634,645 69,458,632 77.22%
2007 40 96 41.67% 62,230,740 81,985,180 75.90%
2008 50 96 52.08% 86,412,269 91,388,901 94.55%
2009 43 96 44.79% 83,312,523 86,703,249 96.09%
2010 39 96 40.63% 91,546,401 11,6837,836 78.35%
2011 42 96 43.75% 126,171,961 134,185,005 94.03%
2012 38 96 39.58% 108,962,728 134,322,565 81.12%
2013 22 96 22.92% 116,809,984 145,869,500 80.08%
2014 10 96 10.42% 96,642,405 145,287,700 66.52%
SPS
2002 15 96 15.63% 1,157,437 23,753,587 4.87%
2003 10 96 10.42% 116,042 35,109,712 0.33%
2004 15 96 15.63% 272,527 49,763,173 0.55%
2005 5 96 5.21% 6,171,236 61,914,983 9.97%
2006 2 96 2.08% 28,672 69,458,632 0.04%
2007 2 96 2.08% 103,375 81,985,180 0.13%
2008 19 96 19.79% 10,666,527 91,388,901 11.67%
2009 5 96 5.21% 9,632,934 86,703,249 11.11%
2010 17 96 17.71% 22,500,593 11,6837,836 19.26%
2011 21 96 21.88% 26,373,274 134,185,005 19.65%
2012 5 96 5.21% 88,563 134,322,565 0.07%
2013 12 96 12.50% 12,163,914 145,869,500 8.34%
2014 13 96 13.54% 998,503 145,287,700 0.69%
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Table A7. Explanatory variables (by natural logarithm) correlations.
IMDC EXTS EXPC Tariff TBTF TBTC SPSF SPSC DSPS DTBT RER Internet
IMDC 1
EXTS 0.653 *** 1
EXPC 0.566 *** 0.666 *** 1
Tariff −0.219 *** −0.086 *** −0.229 *** 1
TBTF 0.233 *** 0.236 *** 0.251 *** −0.099 *** 1
TBTC 0.212 *** 0.216 *** 0.224 *** −0.095 *** 0.954 *** 1
SPSF −0.008 −0.125 *** −0.114 *** 0.033 0.001 0.013 1
SPSC −0.017 −0.127 *** −0.119 *** 0.035 0.005 0.019 0.971 *** 1
DSPS 0.031 −0.082 *** −0.072 *** 0.017 0.011 0.022 0.957 *** 0.915 *** 1
DTBT 0.305 *** 0.310 *** 0.320 *** −0.097 *** 0.940 *** 0.869 *** −0.033 −0.031 −0.010 1
RER 0.0356 −0.042 * 0.023 −0.054 ** −0.006 −0.018 0.000 0.000 0.002 −0.010 1
Internet 0.246 *** 0.097 *** 0.263 *** −0.839 *** 0.030 0.030 0.009 0.002 0.036 0.021 0.090 *** 1
Note: * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A8. Estimation results of total sample using dummy variables.
Whole Sample (HS01–97) Agriculture (HS01–24) Manufacture (HS25–97)
EXTS
0.49 *** 0.49 *** 1.06 *** 1.06 *** 0.46 *** 0.46 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
IMDC
0.41 *** 0.41 *** 0.19 *** 0.20 *** 0.42 *** 0.42 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
EXPC
0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.03 0.03 0.13 *** 0.13 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
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Table A8. Cont.
Whole Sample (HS01–97) Agriculture (HS01–24) Manufacture (HS25–97)
Tariff
−0.16 ** −0.28 * −0.16 **
(0.08) (0.17) (0.08)
DTBT
−0.01 0.00 −0.13 −0.12 0.01 0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
DSPS
0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.19 ** 0.18 **
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
RER
−0.34 * −0.50 ** −0.56 −0.53 −0.33 * −0.49 **
(0.18) (0.21) (0.35) (0.45) (0.18) (0.21)
Internet
0.09 ** 0.07 0.09 **
(0.04) (0.11) (0.04)
country==JP −0.90 ** −1.29 ** −1.59 * −1.53 −0.86 ** −1.25 **
(0.43) (0.52) (0.85) (1.12) (0.42) (0.52)
Constant
−0.32 0.00 −2.62 −3.49 0.04 0.35
(0.92) (0.98) (1.84) (2.26) (0.91) (0.98)
Pseudo log likelihood −375,000,000 −374,000,000 −3,250,000 −3,270,000 −353,000,000 −352,000,000
Number of observations 2496 2496 624 624 1872 1872
R2 0.88 0.89 0.75 0.75 0.88 0.88
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A9. Estimation results of Japan: Interacted dummies with sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and
technical barriers to trade (TBT).
Whole Sample (HS01–97) Agriculture (HS01–24) Manufacture (HS25–97)
EXTS
0.54 *** 0.54 *** 1.15 *** 1.16 *** 0.51 *** 0.51 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
IMDC
0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.29 *** 0.30 *** 0.34 *** 0.34 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
EXPC
0.14 *** 0.13 *** 0.19 *** 0.21 *** 0.14 *** 0.13 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Tariff
−0.25 *** 0.41 ** −0.24 ***
(0.08) (0.18) (0.08)
DTBT
−0.05 −0.04 0.00 0.08 −0.03 −0.01
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)
DSPS
0.06 0.05 −0.09 −0.07 0.12 ** 0.10 *
(0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
RER
−0.60 *** −0.72 *** −1.17 ** −0.19 −0.58 *** −0.70 ***
(0.19) (0.22) (0.51) (0.53) (0.19) (0.23)
Internet
0.12 *** −0.42 *** 0.12 ***
(0.04) (0.10) (0.04)
Constant
0.03 −0.33 −8.55 *** −9.73 *** 0.37 0.01
(0.57) (0.52) (1.66) (1.34) (0.57) (0.53)
Pseudo log likelihood −132,000,000 −132,000,000 −1,110,000 −1,020,000 −122,000,000 −121,000,000
Obs.# 1248 1248 312 312 936 936
R2 0.95 0.96 0.87 0.91 0.95 0.95
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A10. Estimation results of Korea: Interacted dummies with SPS and TBT.
Whole Sample (HS01–97) Agriculture (HS01–24) Manufacture (HS25–97)
EXTS
0.36 *** 0.36 *** 0.99 *** 0.99 *** 0.32 *** 0.32 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
IMDC
0.53 *** 0.53 *** 0.12 *** 0.12 *** 0.55 *** 0.55 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
EXPC
0.17 *** 0.17 *** −0.07 −0.08 0.17 *** 0.17 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Tariff
−0.10 −0.77 *** −0.11
(0.13) (0.17) (0.13)
DTBT
−0.02 −0.02 −0.20 −0.19 −0.01 −0.00
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16)
DSPS
0.16 0.16 0.21 * 0.23 * 0.24 0.24
(0.19) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) (0.20) (0.20)
RER
−0.09 −0.14 0.11 −0.97 * −0.09 −0.16
(0.28) (0.37) (0.38) (0.50) (0.27) (0.36)
Internet
0.03 0.45 *** 0.04
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Constant
−2.43 * −2.46 −1.89 1.18 −2.03 −1.99
(1.38) (1.69) (2.22) (2.59) (1.35) (1.66)
Pseudo log likelihood −226,000,000 −226,000,000 −1,620,000 −1,610,000 −213,000,000 −213,000,000
Obs.# 1248 1248 312 312 936 936
R2 0.84 0.84 0.74 0.75 0.84 0.84
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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